Soft Snow Dragon: China’s Arctic Policy Legitimation Discourses between 2012 and 2019

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Arctic sunset. Photo: NOAA’s National Ocean Service

The Arctic Institute China Series 2025

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As a non-Arctic country, China has no legitimate territorial right within the Arctic Circle, and yet its presence and influence in the region have grown significantly, most notably in the 2010s.¹⁾Koivurova, Timo and Sanna Kopra. Chinese Policy and Presence in the Arctic. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2020. This paper identifies the discourses and legitimation strategies used by Chinese political leaders and diplomats to justify China’s involvement in Arctic affairs between 2012 and 2019. It also examines how these discourses connect with broader themes in Chinese foreign policy, particularly the foreign policy narrative of “a shared future for mankind,” a key concept promoted by President Xi Jinping since 2012. The narrative aims to construct a multilateral and equal international system, but which would be based, by critical interpretations, on Chinese wisdom and worldview.²⁾Kallio, Jyrki. “Multilateralism with Chinese Characteristics.” Multilateral Cooperation in an Era of Strategic Competition: Options for Influence for Finland and the European Union, edited by Juha Jokela, Katja Creutz and Alana Saul. Helsinki: Prime Minister’s Office, 2023, 64–74.

The results reveal three main discourses that China utilized to legitimate its Arctic presence between 2012 and 2019: multilateralism, respect, and convergence. Each of these discourses consist of two or three thematic focuses that formed the overall discourse.

In general, all the discourses emphasized China’s soft power influence in the Arctic region, but they also revealed important interests for China, such as economic objectives. The discourses are also contextualized within China’s foreign policy objectives, such as the narrative of ‘a shared future of mankind’.

The analysis is conducted by critical discourse analysis, with theoretical support from Theo van Leeuwen’s framework for studying strategies of legitimation. These are authorization, rationalization, and narrativization.³⁾van Leeuwen, Theo. “Legitimation in Discourse and Communication.” Discourse & Communication, 1/2007, 91–112. https://doi.org/10.1177/1750481307071986 They are utilized to dissect how China presented its Arctic policy and presence as legitimate, necessary, and morally grounded.

Primary data consists of speeches by the Chinese foreign minister, vice foreign minister, vice premier and ambassadors (2012, 2015, 2017); observer review report submitted to the Arctic Council (2016) and an ambassadorial interview (2019) about China’s Arctic policy. Historical reasoning is also utilized to place China’s Arctic discourses in the broader context of its geopolitical ambitions and evolving role in global governance.

Multilateralism

The first legitimation discourse, multilateralism, framed China as a cooperative and rule-abiding global actor. In this discourse, three thematic focuses that China emphasized were climate change mitigation and active participation in multilateral forums.

China portrayed its actions in the Arctic as serving the global good, improving peace, and encouraging mutual benefit and cooperation though rationalization and narrativization. For instance, Chinese officials, such as vice foreign minister Zhang Ming, frequently brought up terms like “win-win cooperation” and “shared governance,”⁴⁾Zhang, Ming, “Keynote Speech by Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Ming at the China Country Session of the Third Arctic Circle Assembly.” 17 October 2015, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. linking their Arctic policy to broader global challenges such as environmental degradation. In addition, Zhang rationalized in his speech to align China’s involvement with global environmental concerns as well, stressing that the effects of Arctic climate change overcome regional boundaries and affect all of humanity, therefore granting China a stake in Arctic affairs.⁵⁾Zhang, Ming, “Keynote Speech by Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Ming at the China Country Session of the Third Arctic Circle Assembly.” 17 October 2015, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China.

China also stressed its activity in multilateral forums through narrativization. This refers to the use of narratives in which content is framed toward either positive or negative outcomes.⁶⁾van Leeuwen, Theo. “Legitimation in Discourse and Communication.” Discourse & Communication, 1/2007, 91–112. https://doi.org/10.1177/1750481307071986 This approach was present, for example, in a speech by China’s Vice Premier Wang Yang at the Arctic Forum in 2017, in which he highlighted the goals of China’s Arctic policy: “promote the improvement of multiple governance patterns in the Arctic, and actively carry out multi-level and wide-ranging international cooperation, so as to achieve mutual benefit and win-win results.”⁷⁾Wang, Yang, “Wang Yang: Work Together to Open up a Bright and New Future for the Arctic.” 29 March 2017, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. Here, Wang employed narrativization by portraying China as an active actor promoting solutions beneficial to all stakeholders in the Arctic. In this sense, Wang narrativized China’s multilateral engagement to produce positive outcomes and thus legitimize China’s influence in the Arctic region.

Despite the constant emphasizing of cooperation and activity, China’s multilateralism discourse reveals certain contradictions. While emphasizing international collaboration, China has on the other hand traditionally preferred bilateral over multilateral diplomacy, particularly in strategically important regions for China such as the South China Sea.⁸⁾Hong, Nong. “Emerging Interests of Non-Arctic Countries in the Arctic: A Chinese Perspective.” Polar Journal, 2/2014, 271–286. https://doi.org/10.1080/2154896X.2014.954888. This tension between multilateralism and bilateralism has also been evident in China’s Arctic policy, where bilateral agreements and projects with Arctic states typically overshadow multilateral commitments because bilateral engagement is often perceived more effective.

Respect

The second discourse, respect, positioned China as a respectful, culturally sensitive actor that supports Indigenous peoples, established practices, and scientific exploration in the Arctic. This discourse therefore centres on scientific exploration and respect for Indigenous peoples. By highlighting its investments in Arctic research stations and icebreaker missions, China presented itself as a nation contributing to collective knowledge and environmental stewardship and in this way showed respect for the established practices in the Arctic. Authorization and narrativization were evident in China’s references to long-standing traditions of exploration and research such as the repeated mention of the Xue Long (Snow Dragon) icebreaker⁹⁾Alexeeva, Olga and Frédéric Lasserre. “The Snow Dragon: China’s Strategies in the Arctic.” China Perspectives, 3/2012, 61–68. https://doi.org/10.4000/chinaperspectives.5958. as a symbol of continuity and peaceful engagement.¹⁰⁾Jin, Zhijian, “Morgunblaðið Publishes A Signed Article by Ambassador Jin Zhijian Entitled China Is An Important Force For Development In The Arctic.” 15 October 2019, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China.

The purposes behind the focus areas of the respect discourse reflect, in addition to serving as legitimation, interests that are important to China. Scientific exploration especially contains such interests. China has been interested in the Arctic region’s significant energy resources and the shorter trade routes made possible by melting ice. In 2018, it announced the Polar Silk Road initiative as part of its Arctic policy strategy to capitalize on these economic opportunities. The aim of the initiative is to create shorter transportation routes for China and gain access to the Arctic’s energy resources, such as gas and oil, which has also created a need for China to strengthen its Arctic scientific research efforts.¹¹⁾Wang, Yaohui and Yanhong Ma. “Costly Signaling and China’s Strategic Engagement in Arctic Regional Governance.” Politics and Governance, 2024. https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.7222. This need lies behind the discourse of respect, making science and research as a focus of legitimation but simultaneously serve China’s own interests.

The narrative of “shared future of mankind’’ was also reflected in the respect discourse. For instance, Foreign Minister Wang shed light on China’s scientific and research efforts when he stated in a 2015 speech that China would, as always, remain committed to Arctic scientific research and practical cooperation.¹²⁾Wang, Yi, “Video Message by Foreign Minister Wang Yi At the Opening Ceremony of the Third Arctic Circle Assembly”, 17 October 2015, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. He justified this by asserting that research in the Arctic is a shared responsibility of humanity, framing China’s scientific and research work as an effort to respect the practices of Arctic states. Similarly, in 2012, China’s Ambassador to Sweden, Lan Lijun, emphasized that most China’s Arctic activities are scientific research.¹³⁾Lan Lijun, 2012. “Statement by H.E. Ambassador Lan Lijun at the Meeting between the Swedish Chairmanship of the Arctic Council and Observers“, Arctic Council Archive. https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/items/b131ea94-15fc-4a0a-9892-8c4a4c4eca8d. Accessed on 19 November 2025. Thus, the emphasis on science and research within the respect discourse of China’s Arctic policy can be understood as having a dual function: it highlights China’s dedication to and respect for the needs and values of the Arctic region and its countries serving as a form of legitimation while simultaneously advancing China’s own interests, for instance through the Polar Silk Road initiative.

China also claimed in 2012–2019 to respect the traditions and needs of Arctic Indigenous peoples, a key concern of the Arctic Council. However, such claims often lacked concrete evidence and were articulated in vague, symbolic terms. Chinese officials, such as Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Ming in 2015, emphasized that China conducts financial support for Indigenous initiatives.¹⁴⁾Zhang, Ming, “Keynote Speech by Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Ming at the China Country Session of the Third Arctic Circle Assembly.” 17 October 2015, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. However the specifics of such support remained unclear. On the other hand, this obscurity was somewhat clarified by offering concrete contributions in China’s 2016 observer state report to the Arctic Council: “China has participated in the Indigenous Peoples’ Secretariat project to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the Arctic Council.”¹⁵⁾Observer Review Report People’s Republic of China, 2016, Arctic Council Archive. This indicates that China felt the need to demonstrate respect for the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic region, aligning itself with the practices of the Arctic Council and its member states.

The sincerity and depth of China’s commitment to Indigenous rights and participatory governance can however raise questions. For example, China does not officially recognize any ethnic group within its own borders as indigenous. However, on the international level, China has supported the rights of indigenous peoples for a considerable time.¹⁶⁾Koivurova, Timo, Liisa Kauppila, Sanna Kopra, Marc Lanteigne, Mingming Shi, Malgorzata (Gosia) Smieszek, Adam Stepien, Juha Käpylä, Harri Mikkola, Egill Thor Nielsson and Matti Nojonen. “China in the Arctic; and the Opportunities and Challenges for Chinese-Finnish Arctic Co-operation.” Publications of the Government´s Analysis, Assessment and Research Activities. Helsinki: Prime Minister’s Office, 2019. http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-952-287-636-2. Therefore, analysing the real sincerity of China’s commitment to Indigenous rights is challenging.

In conclusion, the respect discourse served an important legitimating function for aligning China with the values and norms upheld by Arctic states and institutions. By emphasizing scientific exploration and respect for Arctic Indigenous peoples, China aimed to legitimate its Arctic policy comprehensively. However, these focus points within the discourse also revealed contradictions and a dual-purpose function. Therefore, one could argue that the respect discourse had a soft exterior but an interest-driven core.

Convergence

The third discourse, convergence, reflected China’s efforts to construct an identity as a “near-Arctic state” and emphasize its 90 years-long presence in the region. Through this discourse, China underscored its direct causality and historical connections to the Arctic. These are also the thematic focuses of the convergence discourse.

China argued that due to climate change and global interdependence, no state can remain unaffected by developments in the Arctic. For example, China’s Ambassador to Iceland, Jin Zhijian stated in 2019 that the developments in the Arctic have a clear link for China:

“China is also closely involved in the trans-regional and global issues in the Arctic, especially in such areas as climate change, environment, scientific research, utilization of shipping routes, resource exploration and exploitation, security, and global governance. These issues are vital to the existence and development of all countries and humanity, and directly affect the interests of non-Arctic States including China.”¹⁷⁾Jin, Zhijian, “Morgunblaðið Publishes A Signed Article by Ambassador Jin Zhijian Entitled China Is An Important Force For Development In The Arctic.” 15 October 2019, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China.

Jin highlighted China’s growing closeness and presence in the Arctic using expressions such as “closely involved”, “are vital to” and “directly affect even non-Arctic states.” These expressions present the idea that developments in the Arctic have a direct causal relationship with China and its interests, thereby justifying China’s presence and increasing engagement in the region. Jin’s emphasis also reflected the thinking of a “shared future for mankind”. Since developments in the Arctic are crucial for all of humankind, China’s approach for deeper involvement in the region is portrayed as legitimate. In this way, Jin legitimized China’s Arctic engagement and policy through narrativization, which can be interpreted in this case as portraying negative outcomes. In Jin’s legitimation, he argued that if non-Arctic or near-Arctic states like China do not participate in Arctic affairs, it could have disastrous consequences for all of humanity.

In addition to direct causality as a thematic focus on the convergence discourse, China also emphasized its 90 years-long presence in the region. Ambassador Jin and Vice Foreign Minister Zhang, for instance, stressed that China had turned its eyes to the Arctic for almost a century ago, in 1925. Zhang mentioned the following in his speech in 2015: “In 1925 China acceded to the Svalbrad Treaty, which marked the beginning of China’s participation in Arctic affairs.“¹⁸⁾Zhang, Ming, “Keynote Speech by Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Ming at the China Country Session of the Third Arctic Circle Assembly.” 17 October 2015, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. The Vice Foreign Minister utilized legitimation through authorization of tradition,¹⁹⁾van Leeuwen, Theo. “Legitimation in Discourse and Communication.” Discourse & Communication, 1/2007, 91–112. https://doi.org/10.1177/1750481307071986 which means appealing to historical practice.

However, in China’s emphasis of convergence as a legitimation, there are also issues that may undermine its credibility. The emphasis on China’s history and achievements in Arctic policy can raise questions. Although China has been active in Arctic science and research since the 1990s,²⁰⁾Alexeeva O & Lasserre F (2012) The Snow Dragon: China’s Strategies in the Arctic. China Perspectives (3/2012): 61–68. its broader Arctic policy only truly began to take shape in the 2010s. As recently as 2009, then-Deputy Foreign Minister Hu Zhengyue declared that China had no Arctic policy.²¹⁾Alexeeva O & Lasserre F (2012) The Snow Dragon: China’s Strategies in the Arctic. China Perspectives (3/2012): 61–68. In contrast, the more recent statements by Foreign Minister Zhang and Ambassador Jin about China’s 90-year Arctic presence reflected a different view. This illustrates the rhetorical shift in China’s Arctic policy in the 2010s but also raises questions about the emphasis on its history and achievements as part of the convergence discourse.

China’s convergence with the Arctic in 2012–2019 was not merely a matter of legitimation but was tied more broadly to the context of Chinese foreign policy, which includes China’s understanding of discursive power in international politics. Puranen and Kopra define this discursive power as China’s ability to control international political narratives, which, if successful, would lead to the country gaining normative and legal influence—for instance, in the Arctic region.²²⁾Puranen M & Kopra S (2023) China’s Arctic Strategy – a Comprehensive Approach in Times of Great Power Rivalry. Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies (1/2023): 239–253. This political thinking is reflected, for example, in the emphasis on the direct effects of the discourse of convergence, where the Arctic was framed as a shared mission for all humankind. Ambassador Jin highlighted this in an interview in 2019: “The future of the Arctic concerns the interests of Arctic states, the well-being of non-Arctic states, and all of humanity.”²³⁾Jin, Zhijian, “Morgunblaðið Publishes A Signed Article by Ambassador Jin Zhijian Entitled China Is An Important Force For Development In The Arctic.” 15 October 2019, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. Deputy Foreign Minister Zhang also stated in 2015 that Arctic challenges, such as climate change, require shared responsibility from all nations.²⁴⁾Zhang, Ming, “Keynote Speech by Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Ming at the China Country Session of the Third Arctic Circle Assembly.” 17 October 2015, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. By engaging with the Arctic region, China sought to construct the governance of the area as a task for all humanity and thus positioning itself as a responsible great power while increasing its influence in the region.

By identifying and framing itself as a near-Arctic state, China aimed to normalize and institutionalize its participation in Arctic governance, even without formal territorial claims. This convergence discourse reminds the broader narrative of China’s global responsibility and its aspiration to shape the rules of international engagement. It also reflected a shift in China’s approach to diplomacy in the early 2010s—from reactive postures to proactive, norm-setting behavior. However, the emphasis on historical presence raised questions on the credibility of convergence discourse.

Conclusion

All three of the discourses legitimating China’s Arctic policy emphasized soft power in both their overall tone and outward appearance. However, beneath this soft exterior, the core was revealed to be shaped by interests. This was most clear in the respect discourse, which emphasized Arctic science and research, and was linked to China’s economic interests such as the Polar Silk Road initiative. Additionally, the tension with bilateralism within multilateralism discourse also reflects this nature. The characteristics of the discourses’ soft exterior and interest-driven core also reflect their dual-use nature; they serve both to justify China’s Arctic policy and to advance China’s own interests. Therefore, the discourses are not unambiguous, as their outward appearance does not fully reflect their true meaning.

In addition, the discourses—multilateralism, respect, and convergence—are united by the foreign policy framework of “a shared future for mankind.” This narrative promotes global cooperation based on Chinese moral and philosophical principles. It is a rhetorical device used to position China not as a revisionist power, but as a stabilizing force advocating peaceful development and mutual respect. It is therefore reasoned to state that this essentially also guided the legitimation discourses in China’s Arctic policy, as well as their focus points. The use of narrativization, which was the most recurring legitimation strategy across all discourses, also supports this view. The repeated use of it in the speeches and reports of Chinese representatives indicates China’s pursuit of continuity and its long-term major foreign policy goals. At the same time, it served to frame China’s own objectives and actions as beneficial to all Arctic states and to humanity comprehensively.

In conclusion, China’s Arctic legitimization discourses in 2012–2019 were emblematic for its evolving foreign policy. They were rooted in soft power and cooperative rhetoric yet serving China’s long-term strategic and normative ambitions at the same time. By analyzing how China legitimized its Arctic presence, the findings offer valuable insights on the broader dynamics of international legitimacy and the role of discourses in shaping regional and global order.

Sampo Sanaksenaho is a master’s student in Social Sciences, majoring in Political History at the University of Turku, and a trainee at the Arctic Centre, University of Lapland, Finland.